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NOTES
OVERCOMING THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL OBSTACLES TO
PRIVATIZATION: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN
THAILAND
Joseph C. Blasko"
I. INTRODUCION
HISTORICALLY, THE PERFoRMANCE of most state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) has been disappointing.! As a result, governments around the
world are privatizing their SOEs at a feverish pace.2 Between 1980 and
1991, more than 6,800 sales and liquidations of state-owned firms have
taken place By the early 1990s, over eighty countries were participating
in "some significant form of privatization."4 Today, many governments
are aggressively seeking to privatize virtually all of their SOEs, including
* B.A., Boston College, 1995; J.D. candidate, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, 1998. The author would like to thank Professor Robert Lawry for his
advice with the drafting of this note.
I SuNrrA KuKERT AL., PRrVATIZATION 2, 15-16 (1992). "In Thailand, sixty-one
SOEs accounted for over sixty percent of the government's foreign debt in 1988." Den-
nis A. Rondinelli & John D. Kasarda, Privatization of Urban Services and Infrastructure
in Developing Countries, in THRw WORLD Crrms 134, 138 (John D. Kasarda & Allan
M. Parnell eds., 1993).
" For the purposes of this Note, "privatization" refers to the process of converting
or transforming, through sale, liquidation, or any other means, state enterprises totally
or partially into private organizations. See Amnuay Viravan, Privatization: Choices and
Opportunities, 7 J. S.E. ASIA Bus. 1 (Fall 1991); see also Kumu Er AL., supra note
1, at 14 ("Privatization can be defined as the transfer of ownership of state-owned en-
terprises to the private sector by the sale - full or partial - of ongoing concerns or
by the sale of assets following liquidation").
3 See KuIm E T AL., supra note 1, at 22. Other reports list the number of SOEs
that have been privatized at more than 15,000. See Kikeri et al., Privatization: Lessons
From Market Economies, 9 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 241, 241 (1994) [hereinafter
Kikeri et al., Lessons]. However, this figure generally includes a "very large number
of completed 'small' privatizations of shops, microenterprises, and kiosks in the retail
and service sectors." KnK ET AL., supra note 1, at 79 n.8. For example, it is
estimated that more than 100,000 such firms have been privatized in Poland, Hungary,
and in the former Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic. See id.
' Helen Nankani, Techniques of State-Owned Enterprises, 1 WORLD BANK TECH.
PAPER 89 (1988); see also KuKR ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
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public utilities and enterprises historically classified as "strategic" indus-
tries.' In the past, governments throughout the world have been reluctant
to privatize these industries due to their close relation to national security
and government control of their nationals. However, today privatization
has become so widely accepted by most countries that it is no longer tied
to the political arena.' Instead, the developed world has specifically
focused on the strategic issues involved, namely pricing, regulation, and
timing of privatization.7
Likewise, the developing world has been an active participant in the
privatization process, albeit to a more limited extent. Slightly more than
2,000, or approximately thirty percent of the 6,800 privatizations have
occurred in developing countries,8 and the size of the SOE sector in a
number of developing countries has been substantially reduced.9 Between
1987 and 1992, foreign direct investment rose by nearly 29 billion dollars
to a projected 38 billion dollars.'" Much of this rapid growth in foreign
direct investment can be attributed to the expansion of privatization
programs over this same period." The number of annual privatizations
rose from twenty-six in 1988 to 416 in 1992, totalling approximately 870
privatizations. 2 Moreover, over the same period of time, privatization
revenues increased from 2.6 billion dollars to 23 billion dollars. 3 Final-
ly, while many of the SOEs privatized in developing countries were small
or medium in size, recent years have witnessed an increase in the number
of large SOEs being sold.'4
Consequently, although the SOE's pace of privatization lags behind
that of the rest of the world, developing countries aggressively have
begun to re-assess the potential of the private sector to take a more active
role in financing and providing public services and physical infrastruc-
' See KIKERt ET AL., supra note 1, at 13. Particular sectors such as mining,
petroleum, telecommunications, finance, transportation, and heavy industry are considered
"strategic industries." See id. Each is central to a country's development because they
provide crucial goods and services to all other industries. See FRANK SADER, PRrvAT-
IZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, 1988-1992 5 (1993).
6 See Viravan, supra note 2, at 3.
See id. at 3-4; see also KIKERI ET AL., supra note 1, at 6-10.
' See KIKERI ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-2.
9 See id. at 23.
,o See SADER, supra note 5, at 3.
See id.
12 See id. at 4, 12.
'3 See id. at 4.
"' See KIKERI ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
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ture."5 One particular sector of the infrastructure in which privatization
has been pursued ardently is the area of telecommunications services.'6
Traditionally, telecommunications services have been provided
exclusively by government-owned and operated entities under monopolis-
tic market structures in the name of national security.'7 However, like
most SOEs, the telecommunications providers have had difficulty mobiliz-
ing significant amounts of capital for the telecommunications network.'"
They also have a poor record of responding to the evolving and varying
needs of businesses and households. 9 Thus, policy-makers of developing
countries, realizing that a modem telecommunications infrastructure is
essential for attracting investment which will lead to economic develop-
ment, have begun to privatize their telecommunications sector.
While the privatization of telecommunications services is a global
phenomena, each country in the developing world has approached the
process differently and has been driven by a combination of varied
motives. In fact, use of the term "privatization" can be misleading
because there are various methods in which a country can open its
telecommunications market to competition. For example, in some Latin
American countries such as Argentina and Mexico, the process has been
characterized by efforts to privatize SOEs at an accelerated pace while
limiting competitive entry into basic service sectors.2' In Mexico, the
process has been relatively structured despite the pace in that it first
"corporatized," then "decentralized," and finally "privatized" its state-
owned telecom.2 Argentina and Mexico were motivated by the need to
,5 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 134-35.
,6 See The Death of Distance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 1995, at 6 (providing a survey
of telecommunications).
" See Thomas J. Casey & Simone Wu, Telecommunications Privatizations: An
Overview, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 781, 781-82 (1994); Veronique Bishop
& Ashoka Mody, Exploiting Competitive Opportunities in Telecommunications, FIN. &
DEv., June 1995, at 39.
S See Bishop & Mody, supra note 17.
'9 See WILIAM W. AMBROSE ET AL., PRIVATIZING TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS:
BusiNEss OPPoRTUNrrms IN DEVELOPING COUNTRMS 5 (1990). Call-completion rates of
less than 50% are common in developing countries. See id. Moreover, telecommuni-
cations SOEs "will have 50-100 employees for every 1000 lines of service, compared
to 0.2 employees or fewer for the same number on lines among telephone companies
in the United States." See id. Finally, significant under-utilization of existing capacity
is a common feature of many developing countries' telecommunication sectors. See id.
See Casey & Wu, supra note 17, at 782.
2, See BJORN WELLENIUS & PETER STERN, IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 161, 177, 197 (1994).
' See Bishop & Mody, supra note 17 (defining "corporatization" as converting the
5091998]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
accumulate significant amounts of foreign investment to combat daunting
deficit problems.'
In contrast to the Latin American experience, the "privatization" of
the telecommunications sector in Asia has been a slower and much more
diverse process.24 Nowhere is the mixed set of strategies and motives
more evident than in the Southeast Asian country of Thailand.' Despite
a strong commitment to common regional issues embodied in such
organizations as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)'
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC),z Thailand
has begun to open its telecommunications sector to competition in a much
different manner than its neighbors and fellow ASEAN and APEC
member states of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Thus, Thailand
provides a unique example of distinct approaches in privatizing a public
utility such as telecommunications services. Whether the telecommuni-
cations master plan proposed by the Transportation and Communications
Ministry of Thailand will meet its objectives is the subject of this Note.
In answering this question, this Note begins with a brief historical
background of the Thai telecommunications sector. The following section
highlights some of the problems experienced among SOEs, focusing
specifically on the telecommunications sector in Thailand. While the
volume and sophistication of telecommunications services in Thailand
SOE into an autonomous organization owned by the government, but run on a commer-
cial basis, while defining "decentralization" as separating the lines of business of the
corporatized SOE in a way which "facilitates greater responsiveness to customers and
increases managerial accountability"). "Privatization" is defined as "a transfer of owner-
ship to the private sector." See id.
2 See KI(ER ET AL., supra note 1, at 14. By the late 1980s, Argentina's SOEs
accounted for 50% of the total public sector deficit. See id. at 36.
24 See WEtLENius & STERN, supra note 21, at 197.
See Dennis A. Rondinelli, Business Participation in the Public Services Industry
in Southeast Asia: Accelerating the Pace of Privatization, 7 J. S.E. ASIA BUs. 3, 3-6
(1991); see also WELLE IUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 211-14.
' The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in August
1967 with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, and Thailand. See Michael R. Reading, The Bilateral Investment
Treaty in ASEAN: A Comparative Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 679, 679 n.1 (1992). Brunei
Darussalam became a member of ASEAN in January of 1984. See id. "The existing
members have voted to admit Vietnam, but it has not yet formally become a member."
See Mary E. Hiscock, Changing Patterns of Regional Law Making in Southeast Asia,
39 ST. Louis L.J. 933, 935 n.7 (1995).
' The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group is comprised of 18
Member States, including among others the ASEAN members, Australia, Japan, and the
United States. See Hiscock, supra note 26, at 938.
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have increased rapidly in recent years, there are various impediments
which may be extremely difficult for the telecommunications sector to
overcome. Furthermore, although the concept of privatization is neither
new nor unique to developing countries, the privatization of large state-
owned public utilities is historically atypical. Therefore, to determine
whether the particular objectives and methods applied by the Thai govern-
ment will be potentially successful, it is imperative that these problems
and issues be examined in detail.
The third part of this Note focuses on the specific objectives of
privatization and the methods chosen to meet those objectives. Some of
the methods of privatization have already been implemented in Thailand,
while others are presently being considered by Parliament under the rubric
of the telecommunications master plan. The first half of this section
reviews the Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) and Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) concession contracts into which the two telecommunications SOEs
have entered with the private sector to provide basic telephone and
cellular services. While not strictly viewed as acts of privatization, these
contracts are a significant departure from past practice, and have enabled
the private sector to become involved in what has traditionally been a
government-owned and operated industry in Thailand. The second half of
this section examines the effect the Act Permitting the Private Sector to
Participate in or Operate State Business (Joint Venture Act) will have on
the privatization process, and concludes by discussing why a new national
telecommunications master plan is needed in the sector.
Finally, this Note examines other methods of privatization involved
in the new national telecommunications master plan and evaluates these
methods of privatization in light of the BTO and BOT agreements. In so
doing, this Note tries to determine just how successful the BTO and BOT
agreements and the new master plan will be vis-h-vis this sector's histori-
cal background and the objectives sought by the Thai government. The
Note then concludes by suggesting that while the "privatization" process
undertaken in Thailand may have a positive impact in the short-run, the
, Once a government decides to privatize state-run enterprises, it is often difficult
for the political leaders to define their objectives and outline the strategic process by
which privatization will occur. As a result, many strategic decisions made by develop-
ig countries are limited and halfhearted. See generally Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra
note 1, at 134-35. For example, the most frequently privatized enterprises are small,
low-value firms in industry and services; not large public utilities. See KIKERI Er AL.,
supra note 1, at 24. Despite a strong correlation between the success of larger SOEs
and the success of a country's economic development, privatization in many developing
countries during the 1980s consisted of a few simple divestitures of money-losing state
enterprises. See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 135.
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long-term effect may actually impede the growth of Thailand's telecom-
munications sector, and subsequently Thailand's national economy.
II. THE THAI TELECOMMUNICAIONS SECTOR: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
The Royal Thai Government has provided telecommunications
services for over a century on a monopoly basis through the Ministry of
Transport and Communications (MOTC).29 Under the MOTC, the gov-
ernment has acted as planner, coordinator, investor, manager, operator,
and regulator of all telecommunications services.' The MOTC controls
these services through three entities which fall under its guidance, namely
the Post and Telegraph Department (PTD), the Telephone Organization of
Thailand (TOT), and the Communications Authority of Thailand
(CAT). 3 1
The Thai government has always paid particularly close attention to
all telecommunications matters, and has amended laws where it believes
it appropriate.32 It was with this goal in mind that the Royal Thai Gov-
ernment established the Telegraph and Telephone Act, B.E. 2477.3a
Promulgated in 1934, the Act embodied the government's sentiment "to
provide greater convenience to the people and to be even more appropri-
ate to the times." The Act gave the PTD "monopolistic rights and au-
thority" over all telegraph and telephone services. 5
" See Somsak Chinvanthananond, Thailand: Telecommunications Equipment and
Services, Nat'l Trade Data Bank's Market Rep., Mar. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Mktrpt File.
3' See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK MARKET
REP., Mar. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Mktrpt File.
3, See id.
See, e.g., Telegraph and Telephone Act, B.E. 2477, opening decree (1934).
3 See id.; Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, [ 5.
See Telegraph and Telephone Act, B.E. 2477, opening decree.
35 Id. at ch. 2, §§ 5, 6. Sections 5 and 6 read as follows:
Section 5. The government reserves the monopolistic rights and authority to install,
maintain and provide telegraph and telephone services with the Kingdom of Siam. This
authority is assigned to the Post and Telegraph Department.
Section 6. Within the Kingdom of Siam, the Post and Telegraph Department shall
be the sole person to have the right and duty to:
(1) install, make and maintain telegraph and telephone offices in any place which the
Minister considers appropriate.
(2) install posts and hang up wires or place wires or cables underground or underwater
or perform other activities in the interests of telegraph or telephone communication [,
and]
(3) receive, collect, transmit and deliver messages, and do all types of other work
connected with telegraph or telephone services in accordance with the regulations, rules,
512 [Vol. 30:507
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In 1954 and 1976 respectively, the TOT and CAT were created from
the PTD by the Ministry of Transport and Communications under charters
issued by the Royal Thai Government at their genesis. "Despite separate
charters, the web of relationships between the PTD, the TOT, and the
CAT has been complex and difficult to unravel." '3 While the PTD re-
tained responsibility for the radio frequency spectrum allocation,37 licens-
ing,38 and international postal coordination and cooperation, 9 the TOT
and the CAT were implicitly given the responsibility for domestic and
international telephone services respectively.' While in theory, this divi-
orders and by laws established by the government.
Id.
' See WE.SENws & STERN, supra note 21, at 211. Compare Telephone Organiza-
tion of Thailand Act, BE. 2497 (1954) with Communications Authority of Thailand
Act, B.E. 2519 (1976). There is no language in either act which specifies either body's
responsibilities.
Radio Communication Act, B.E. 2498, § 11 (1955).
Section 11. Radio communication stations shall use the exact frequencies specified in the
rules on radio communications according to the annex to the International Telecommu-
nications Convention.
In order to insure conformity with the said rules, the Director General of the Post and
Telegraph Department or his delegate shall have the power to control and specify the
use of frequencies by radio communication stations.
Id.; but see id. § 29, which states that "the Minister of Communications shall be in
charge of the execution of this Act . .. .
' Id. § 19. Section 19 reads as follows:
Section 19. In the case the licensee contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or
any Ministerial Regulations issued pursuant hereto or conditions specified in his license,
the licensing officer has the power to order the withdrawal or suspension of such
person's license. The licensee may appeal to the Director General of the Post and
Telegraph Department within thirty days from the date of withdrawal or suspension of
his license. The decision of the Director General of the Post and Telegraph Department
shall be final.
Id.; but see § 29, which states that "the Minister of Communications shall be in charge
of the execution of this Act ...."
" See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, I 5. However, many
would agree that most of PTD functions have been assigned to the TOT and the CAT.
See Denton Hail Burgin & Warrens Asian Communications Group, Asia: A Special
Report, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Supp. Mar. 1992, at 7, 16 [hereinafter Burgin & Warrens].
' See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 917; see also Telephone
Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, § 6 (stating in part that the TOT is
established "having the objectives of carrying out and promoting telephone activities for
the benefit of the State and the public and carrying out the business in connection with
telephone activities and other business incidental, pertaining or beneficial to telephone
activities"); Communications Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519, ch. 1, § 7 (listing
CAT's objectives, but without specific language regarding the CAT's responsibility for
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sion would seem to clearly delineate both bodies' responsibilities, a
careful look at the charters for the TOT and the CAT suggest other-
wise." The TOT's charter grants the organization the power to provide
"all services in connection with telephone activities" and to fix rates of
charges for "any services rendered in connection with telephone activi-
ties."42 However, there is nothing in either charter which indicates that
the TOT is responsible for domestic telecommunications issues and that
the CAT is responsible for international telecommunications.43 Neverthe-
less, the responsibilities of both the TOT and the CAT are well-known."
The TOT has long been considered the "backbone" of the country's
telecommunications network.45 Once dominated by the Thai army, the
TOT is responsible for the domestic local and long distance public
telephone networks;' domestic long-distance;' telephone lines;' leased
circuit services;49 and value-added services.' The TOT is also responsi-
overseeing international telecommunications services). Nevertheless, it is well-known that
the Act was specifically enacted to oversee the international telecommunications net-
work. See generally Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30.
" See generally Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497; Communica-
tions Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519.
42 Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, §§ 9(2), 9(3).
I Id.; Communications Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519.
See generally Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30.
4 See generally i.
See Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, § 16 (stating in
part that "[tihe Telephone Organization shall acquire all rights and duties conferred by
law upon the Post and Telegraph Department in so far as telephone activities are con-
cerned"). 'The Telegraph and Telephone Act of 1934 granted monopolistic rights and
authority for the installation, maintenance and provision of telegraph and telephone
services to the PTD." Thailand: Telecommunications and Equipment, supra note 29.
4 See Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, § 16. The
domestic long-distance service includes regional calls to neighboring countries in the
region. See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 91 7.
8 See Thailand: Monopolies and Market Dominance, ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
Jan. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Alleiu File (stating that included
among the TOT's responsibilities is the billing for services for using the telephone
lines).
4 See Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, at ch. 1, §§ 9(1), 16.
A few of the leased circuit services that the TOT oversees include domestic
transmission of voice, data, telegraph, telex, radio, and television. See Thailand:
Telecommunications and Equipment, supra note 29.
o See Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, §§ 9(2), 16.
Among the value-added services that the TOT oversees are the cellular radio telephone,
radio paging, video text, and card phones. See Thailand: Telecommunications and
Equipment, supra note 29, 1 10; Thailand, Walden Publishing Ltd. Country Reports,
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ble for setting rates for telephone services and for establishing regulations
concerning telephone equipment and services5
The CAT, on the other hand, is a relative newcomer. Like the TOT,
the CAT is also responsible for all telecommunications activities in
Thailand, except to the extent that responsibility is specifically conferred
to other bodies, such as the TOT.52 While it is understood that the TOT
specifically oversees the domestic telephone service and a few other
related businesses, the CAT is viewed as having a monopoly over nearly
all other forms of telecommunications activities. 3 The CAT is responsi-
ble for the domestic postal services;54 the public international telephone
services;55 domestic and international public telegraph and telex servic-
es;s international leased circuits;' cellular telephones;58 and interna-
tional facsimile and data packet services5 9
However, there are features that both the TOT and the CAT do have
in common. Both bodies were established as state enterprises rather than
regular government entities.6 As state-owned enterprises, the TOT and
Jan. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Courep File [hereinafter Thailand,
Walden Reports].
s' See Burgin & Warrens, supra note 39, at 16.
32 See Communications Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519, ch. 1, §§ 4, 7.
Section Four. The Post Office Act, B.E. 2477, the Telegraph and Telephone Act, B.E.
2477 and all rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto in so far as they are con-
cemed with the postal and telecommunications service shall continue to be in force in
so far as they are not contrary to and inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
Id. § 4. Section seven establishes the CAT to operate and improve the activities of the
telecommunications sector, except for those activities "specifically prescribed by laws to
be within the powers and duties of other juristic persons." Id. § 7; see also Burgin &
Warrens, supra note 39, at 16.
S3 See Burgin & Warrens, supra note 39, at 16.
Communications Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519, ch. 1, §§ 12, 16. Section
12 transfers "the entire postal fund under the Postal Fund Act, B.E. 2504" to the CAT
except for the postal fund allocated for the Office of the Secretary, International
Communications Division of the Post and Telegraph Department. Id. § 12.
SS See id. ch. 1, § 13 (transferring all activities of the Post and Telegraph De-
partment, other than those under the Office of the Secretary, International Communica-
tions Division, Planning Division, and the Office of Frequency Management to the
CAT). The CAT is responsible for all public international calls except for those to
countries which share a border with Thailand. See Thailand: Telecommunications and
Equipment, supra note 29, I 10.
- See Thailand: Telecommunications and Equipment, supra note 29, [ 10.
See id.
s' See id.
5 See id.
o See Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, § 10; Communi-
1998]
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the CAT are extremely limited since their charters stipulate that they must
operate under regular Royal Thai government budget constraints." Thus,
both the TOT and the CAT are forced to compete not only with other
governmental agencies, but also with more than sixty other SOEs for their
share of the national budget and the annual public sector external borrow-
ing limit.
62
III. THE PROBLEMS OF THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE: THE TOT &
THE CAT
There are certainly "as many reasons for privatization as there are
countries that privatize."' 3 This holds true for developing countries such
as Thailand. However, to determine why a particular country such as
Thailand is interested in privatizing its telecommunications sector, it is
important to set forth the general problems associated with state owner-
ship of public utilities.
Although some SOEs have been productive and profitable,"M the
governments of most developing countries have failed to provide reliable
cations Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519, ch. 1, §§ 7, 11(3). "TOT and CAT are
100% state-equity agencies." See Thailand Watchlist, Bus. ASIA, Apr. 10, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
6 See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 6; Telephone Organi-
zation of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 3, § 41. Section 41 states:
The Telephone Organization shall make an annual budget classifying into investment
budget and operation budget. The investment budget shall be submitted to the Council
of Ministers for consideration and approval and the operation budget shall be submitted
to the Council of Ministers for information.
Id. Cf Communications Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519, ch. 3, § 40.
The Communications Authority of Thailand shall prepare an annual budget which shall
be divided into a capital account and account and [a] working account. The capital
account shall be submitted to the Council of Ministers for consideration and approval
while the working account shall be submitted to the Council of Ministers for informa-
tion.
Id.
62 See Telecommunications and Power May Set Privatization Trend, E. ASIAN EXEC.
REP., July 15, 1993, at 8, 8 [hereinafter Telecommunications and Power]. As of 1993,
there were 62 SOEs in Thailand. See id. at 26. While there is only a finite amount of
funds to be divided amongst the 62 enterprises, the SOEs are also constrained by a
government imposed U.S. $2.5 billion annual ceiling on public sector foreign borrowing.
See id. at 28.
'3 Casey & Wu, supra note 17, at 782.
64 See, e.g., KIKERI ET AL., supra note 1, at 42-43. The authors point to the French
national electricity company, the Korean national steel producer, the Ethiopian national
airline, and an Indonesian fertilizer company as examples of well-run, profitable, and
efficient SOEs. See id.
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services on a national level.' A large number of SOEs have been eco-
nomically inefficient, incurred heavy financial losses, and absorbed
disproportionate shares of domestic credit.' Of particular concern has
been the burden that loss-generating SOEs place on the hard-pressed
public budgets of developing countries like Thailand.67
Furthermore, in countries with a significant number of SOEs, the
industrial infrastructure has remained underdeveloped, leading to an
inability to attract domestic and foreign investment.s The resulting lack
of much needed capital ultimately inhibits the country's economic devel-
opment, and in turn prevents a country from developing its infrastruc-
ture.' As one analyst has stated "[tihe poor quality of infrastructure in
most emerging economies often leads to a vicious circle of inertia."7
Moreover, because of rapid technological changes in the industry, the
capital needed to run an effective and efficient telecommunications system
has diminished. Traditionally, large fixed capital requirements were
needed for efficient operation of the telecommunications system.7' Fixed
costs were so considerable that it was generally economically sound to
have one firm - usually the State - provide that service as a monopo-
ly. 2 However, today technological advances are rapidly reducing the cost
of producing, installing, and operating transmission and switching
6' See Kokila Doshi, The Rush to Privatize in the Asia-Pacific Region, 19 Bus. F.,
Jan. 1994, at 42, 42 (stating that "external pressures such as the oil shock and
worldwide recession in the mid-1970s, combined with internal factors such as price
distortions, heavy subsidies, and public mismanagement, resulted in heavy financial
losses by the SOEs and in rising foreign debts").
" See SAnER, supra note 5, at 5-6.
mhe efficiency considerations, initially used as an explanation for the rapidly expanding
economic activities of the public sector, were quickly replaced by short-term political
goals, rendering SOEs primarily as large employers and suppliers of highly subsidized
goods and services to the public. Instead of... fostering the development of private
industry through the provision of essential services ... .they typically turned out to
be grossly inefficient, resulting in bottlenecks and generally inadequate and deteriorating
infrastructural conditions.
Id.; see also Doshi, supra note 65, at 42 (discussing internal and external forces
causing financial losses in many SOEs).
6 See generally SAnER, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that many inefficient SOEs
incurred substantial financial losses which led to a serious drain on the country's
budget).
' See Scott Durchslag et al., The Promise of Infrastructure of Privatization,
McKiNsay Q., Jan. 1994, at 3, 3-4.
6 See id. at 4.
7 Id.
7, See id.
See id. at 3. This is what is often referred to as a "natural monopoly." See id.
517
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equipment.' Technology such as fiber optic lines have driven down the
cost of producing, installing, and operating transmissions equipment, so
the investment requirements have fallen as well.74 As a result, it is
considerably easier for smaller companies to enter the market and in-
creasing numbers of private telecommunications operators have entered
the market, in most countries.75 Consequently, the traditional view that
only one extremely large corporation (i.e. the government) is capable of
funding a network which requires large capital expenditures has become
a myth. 6
The problems encountered by most countries with state-owned
enterprises have not eluded Thailand's telecommunications sector. First,
the government has not made a very good manager and operator.7 Due
to bureaucratic red tape and a vacuum of technical expertise at the upper
levels of management,78 the telecommunications sector has suffered
considerably, and consistently has fallen behind in the goals established
in its past five-year plans.79 Because of the ineffectiveness of the
government's management, Thailand's telecommunications sector has been
unable to support public demand."0 The failure of the TOT and the CAT
in providing "universal" telecommunications services is well-document-
7 See id. at 5.
7 See id.
s See id. For example, "a monopoly can be maintained in the actual physical
infrastructure while new services are provided by attaching computer nodes that
communicate with subscribers over existing circuits." Id.
76 See id.
7 See Telecommunications and Power, supra note 62.
See Thailand: Private Sector Offers Telecom Plan Alternative, BANGKOK POST,
July 3, 1995, at 24 [hereinafter Plan Alternative]. Cf. Telecommunications and Power,
supra note 62 ("The efficiency of state enterprises varies widely, but most have
operated profitably . . . . Some of those that operate in the red are characterized by
inefficient management, poor financial performance, and inadequate service and
maintenance").
' See Transport & Communications: Post and Telecommunications, Econ. Intelli-
gence Unit Country Profile, Jan. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Alleiu
File ('The plans of the TOT included a significant expansion and modernization of the
network under the fifth five-year plan (1982-86), but these were plagued by difficul-
ties").
'o See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 134.
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ed.8 Although the network is considered fairly modem,' it is not very
extensive,' and the waiting list for a phone line is extremely long."
Furthermore, the poor infrastructure and the limited size of the
consumer base has resulted in a smaller amount of revenue available for
the TOT and the CAT.' This revenue is vital for investment in the
telecommunications infrastructure. 6 The problem is cyclical, and as a
result the Thai telecommunications network has become completely over-
whelmed by public demand." To add insult to injury, the Thai govern-
81 See AMBROSE ET AL., supra note 19, at 3. The concept of "universal service" in
the context of the telecommunications sector is that the telecommunications services not
be limited to urban areas or businesses, but instead be extended to all. See id. A
number of industrialized countries have only considered privatization and liberalization
of their telecommunications sectors "once universal service has been attained." Id.
' Close to 80% of the domestic telecommunications system is tied to digitally
stored program control exchanges. See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note
30, 8. This digital exchange technology enables TOT to provide a number of
technologically advanced telecommunications services. See id. f 14. In addition, the
government has also begun implementing several projects including an integrated servic-
es digital network (ISDN). See id. [ 19. "ISDN is a sophisticated telephone network
that revolutionizes the traditional telephone line by carrying out not only voice of
superior clarity, but also computer data, visual images." See id. [ 20. ISDN also pro-
vides services such as video conferencing and telebanking. See id.
For example, it is estimated that there are only 600 ISDN lines in Bangkok and
1,100 lines throughout the rest of the country. See TOT 'Too Slow' With ISDN Line
Expansion, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 24, 1995, at 28. Furthermore, the total number of
fiber optic kilometers has been described as "nil" with a total of 8,530 kilometers of
fiber optic cable to be installed by 1995. See Thailand: Fiber Optic Cable Market Pro-
file, National Trade Data Bank Market Rep., Dec. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Mktrpt File. As for the number of telephone lines for basic telecommunications
service, the figures range from 2.2 million or 3.1 lines for every 100 Thai nationals to
2.5 million or 4.0 for every 100 Thai nationals. See generally Phone Stocks Rise as
Thais Get That Long-Distance Feeling, FIN. PosT, Dec. 2, 1994, § 1, at 15 [hereinafter
Long-Distance Feeling]; Victor Mallet, Survey of Asia-Pacific Telecommunications, FIN.
Tams (London), Feb. 25, 1994, at 16. To put these figures in perspective, in 1992,
Malaysia had 11.7 lines, Singapore had 41 lines, and South Korea had 35 lines per
100 individuals. See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 9.
There are approximately 1.56 million potential subscribers waiting for phone
service. See Thailand: Cabinet May Debate Roles of Private Telecom Firms, BANGKOK
PosT, Mar. 28, 1995, at 21. By 1998, The Ministry of Transport and Communications
estimates that the telephone demand will be 3.9 million subscribers. See id. Business
users are generally given priority; therefore, most waiting are residential users. See id.
See Rondinelli and Kasarda, supra note 1, at 136-41.
See id.
s See Long-Distance Feeling, supra note 83 (stating that one million people in
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ment has routinely diverted a significant portion of the revenue generated
by the telecommunications sector to other utilities in dire need of funding
and other politically favored projects.
Yet, this does not mean that the TOT and the CAT are expected to
obtain all of the funding for future infrastructure projects from the fiscal
revenue that they generate in providing telecommunications services. As
mentioned above, the CAT and the TOT receive a considerable amount
of their funding directly from the government. However, this also con-
stitutes a problem because, as state-owned enterprises, the TOT and CAT
are forced to compete for funding with other SOEs and government
ministries, and are consequently often under-funded.' Furthermore, the
Thai government has not been able to turn to telecommunications legisla-
tion for relief or guidance. Instead, most of the problems experienced by
the telecommunications sector have been exacerbated by the language, or
lack thereof, in the Acts and Charters of the PTD, TOT, and CAT.
Although the three pieces of legislation clearly authorize each individual
body to administer and regulate the telecommunications sector, they fail
to establish the specific duties and responsibilities of each group. 9
Furthermore, the charters which created the TOT in 1954 and the CAT in
1976 failed to set forth how the three entities were supposed to coordi-
nate their operations.'
The three acts also fail to assert any substantive objective for either
the PTD, TOT, or CAT. The opening line of the Telegraph and Tele-
phone Act defines the PTD's mission as being "provid[ing] greater
convenience to the people and to be even more appropriate to the
times.""' Likewise, the CAT's charter simply states that the CAT has
been established as a matter of "expediency."' The TOT's charter is a
bit more specific in that its objective is clearly related to "promoting
telephone activities."'93 However, it is unclear from the ambiguous lan-
guage governing the area which telecommunications activities the TOT is
to provide vis-a-vis the objectives and duties of the PTD and the CAT.
To make matters worse, the Acts and Charters are out of date and are not
Bangkok and one-half million elsewhere are waiting for phone lines).
See generally Telecommunications and Power, supra note 62, at 8, 26-28.
s See generally Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497; Communica-
tions Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519.
' See generally Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497; Communica-
tions Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519.
9' Telegraph and Telephone Act, B.E. 2477, opening decree.
9 Communications Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519, opening decree.
9 Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, § 6.
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flexible enough to take into account fully the technological advances
which have taken place since the 1930s, 1950s, or even the 1970s.94
Finally, Thailand's political history has been extremely tumultuous.95
Punctuated by a succession of military coups, Thailand has been affected
by political instability to a far greater extent than any other country in
the region.' Political instability has had a far reaching effect on all
facets of the economy, and the telecommunications sector has been no
exception.' The sector has found it difficult to remain insulated entirely
from the political situation." The successful implementation of any
modernization initiative requires a high degree of political support."
When this political support falters, the new project also falters." Thus,
although the incentive for using new entities might be to bypass existing
institutional structures, this can precipitate a political crisis."' As a
result, much needed change is often slow in coming."°
See Burgin & Warrens, supra note 39, at 15-18.
For example, no elected government has survived the full four-year term in
Thailand's history as a democratic state. See Thailand, Walden Reports, supra note 50.
" See WELLENUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 211; Thailand, Walden Reports,
supra note 50 (stating that when Chuan Leekphai, leader of the Democratic Party,
emerged as the head of the ruling coalition in September 1992, he became the first
Thai prime minister in 16 years who had no military connections).
' See Vivat Prateepchaikul, Thailand: Ulterior Motive May Be Behind Rejection of
Phone Line Project, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 24, 1995, at 4.
1 See WELLEMNS & STERN, supra note 21, at 211. For example, Foreign Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra was forced to resign in February 1995. See William Barnes, Thai
Minister May Have to Go, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 11, 1995, at 3. According to
Thai constitutional amendments, cabinet members are banned from holding a direct or
indirect interest in government business concessions. See id. Having built Thailand's
biggest telecommunications company, Shinawatra Computer & Communications Compa-
ny, which has won a number of government contracts, it was clear that there was a
conflict of interest. See id.; Thailand: Thai Telecoms Re-Think, ELEcTRONICS TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1995, at 80.
See Prateepchaikul, supra note 97.
'o See Thailand: Phone Plan in the Hands of New Minister, BANGKOK POST, May
23, 1995, at 15 (discussing the effect that the dissolution of the House of Repre-
sentatives would have on the implementation of telecommunications mega projects); see
also Outlook: Infrastructure Plans May Be Hit by Politics, Econ. Intelligence Unit
Country Reports, June 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Alleiu File (noting
examples of the relationship of political support and success of new projects).
101 See WELLENWS & STERN, supra note 21, at 213.
For example, the present telecommunications master plan has been in the works
since 1992. See Thailand: Telephone Company Privatizes, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK
MARKEr REP., Nov. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Mktrpt File.
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Other domestic political forces have also opposed the transfer of
ownership and control from the State to the private sector. For example,
labor groups have been opposed to institutional changes since state
workers are better paid and receive better benefits packages than regular
staff-level workers in the private sector.' Managers and even military
leaders have been opposed to the institutional changes.3 4 Managers
regard ownership transfer as career-threatening, while military officers
traditionally retire to positions in SOEs. °5 Thus, there have been a con-
siderable number of obstacles such as political parties and lobbying
groups which have allowed the inefficient status quo to remain in exis-
tence.
IV. THE METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION: BOT AND BTO AGREEMENTS
The Thai government has clearly committed itself to privatizing those
SOEs associated with the country's infrastructure."° The government has
recognized the problems which have plagued the state-owned enterprises,
and has turned to privatization as a "positive policy tool" for remedying
those problems."°
The telecommunications sector has been one of the first state-owned
public utilities to be considered for privatization, and the government has
made its objectives extremely clear.' First, the government hopes to
mobilize financial resources from the private sector."° The present Sev-
enth Five-Year National Development Plan calls for an estimated $50
billion for expansion of infrastructural facilities."0 No developing coun-
try has deep enough pockets to meet these daunting financial needs, and
therefore the Thai government has literally been forced to look to the pri-
,o See Telecommunications and Power May Set Privatization Trend; Part II, 15 E.
ASIAN ExEcuTIvE REP., Aug. 15, 1993, at 24 [hereinafter Telecommunications and
Power, Part Il].
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See Durchslag et al., supra note 68, at 3. Infrastructure is defined by example
as including such industrial sectors as transportation, power, and telecommunications.
See id.
107 Doshi, supra note 65, at 42.
o See TOT to be Restructured, PRIVATIZATION INT'L, Mar. 1, 1995, available in
1995 WL 8379661 (stating that "if the TOT privatization takes place, it would become
only the second major state enterprise utility to be privatized following in the footsteps
of the General Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand"); Viravan, supra note 2,
at 6 (stating that as of 1991 there are more than 60 state-owned enterprises in
existence in Thailand).
"o See Viravan, supra note 2, at 6.
Ho See id.
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vate sector. Second, and more importantly, this revenue must be em-
ployed effectively and efficiently."' Therefore, the government has also
turned to privatization as a means of attracting both technological and
managerial expertise to remain competitive with the rest of the region and
the world. 12
Despite these objectives, the privatization process is a relatively
recent phenomena in Thailand. Feeling the pressure of an overwhelming
public demand for basic and advanced services, and a desire to compete
with Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore as a major trade and telecom-
munications hub,"3 the Thai government began to broaden its policy on
telecommunications services."' By inviting the private sector to invest
in the expansion and operation of the national telephone network in a
cooperative arrangement, the government began meeting its revenue and
infrastructure needs. 5
Following the recommendation of the National Economic and Social
Development Board's (NESDB) Sixth Five-Year Plan,"6 the government
invited the private sector to invest in and operate part of the nation's tele-
communications services." 7 This constituted a significant departure from
past practice and was difficult to implement."' Although the private
sector has been involved in the telecommunications sector, the level of in-
volvement has been extremely limited to a small number of insignificant
projects." 9 However, the traditionally limited involvement of the private
" See Doshi, supra note 65, at 44.
m See generally id. at 42-46; Viravan, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining the privatiza-
tion trend in the ASEAN region, and the feasibility, availability, and support for
privatization in the region).
"' See Thailand: Telecommunications Master Plan Approved by Cabinet, BANGKOK
PosT, Mar. 29, 1995, at 17 (stating that one reason Thailand should increase its tele-
communications capacity is to turn Thailand into a "telecommunications hub for South-
east Asia"); Paul M. Sherer, Vichit Readies Telecom, AsIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1995,
at 1 (stating that according to Thailand's Minister of Transport and Communications,
Vichit Suraphongchai, "[t]he motivation is clearly how to build up the telecom industry
in Thailand to be able to compete with other countries, and also to satisfy the demand,
which is growing very fast').
... See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, M11 , 14, 15.
' See id. Tff 1, 14.
116 Thailand's Sixth Five-Year Plan ran from 1987 to 1991. See generally Thailand:
Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 35.
11 See Thailand, ASIAMONEY, Oct. 1994, at 37, 37.
12 See id.
'9 See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 14.. The private
sector's involvement in telecommunications has been in such "piecemeal projects" as
licensing for publication of telephone directories and turn-key switching contracts. See
1998]
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sector aside, the more serious obstacle for the government was a statutory
prohibition, precluding private sector ownership of telecommunications
assets."n Therefore, in many ways, it was extremely difficult for the
government to look to the private sector for assistance in any large and
expansive projects.'
The Royal Thai government has constructively avoided this dilemma
through the formation of concessionary BTO and BOT contracts. Under
the TOT Act and the CAT Act, each authority is allowed only to collabo-
rate or combine with other parties to carry on their respective activi-
ties. ' In 1989, the Royal Thai government began inviting the private
sector to invest in the expansion and operation of the national telephone
network in cooperative BTO and BOT arrangements."z Under this
scheme, local private firms with technical expertise provided by major
partners from Europe, Japan, and the United States are able to invest in
the telecommunications sector.24
In a BTO arrangement, the private firm initially funds and installs
the assets."z The firm then immediately transfers all assets to the gov-
ernment.'2 The government, in turn, leases the assets back to the pri-
vate firm for a fee."2 The private finn then operates the systems and
share profits with the government concession-grantor." In a BOT ar-
id.
120 See Telegraph and Telephone Act, B.E. 2477, ch. 2, § 5 (reserving for the
government "the monopolistic rights and authority to install, maintain and provide
telegraph and telephone services with the Kingdom of Siam").
12, See WELLENItJS & STERN, supra note 21, at 212 (stating the rigidities in the
existing sectoral arrangements between the TOT and the CAT as the reason for the pri-
vate sector not being heavily involved in the telecommunications arena).
" See Telephone Organization of Thailand Act, B.E. 2497, ch. 1, § 9(6) (giving the
TOT the power to collaborate or combine with other persons for the benefit of the
work of the Telephone Organization, as well as the power to enter into partnership or
hold shares in any partnership); Communications Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2519,
ch. 1, § 10(6) (granting the CAT the power "to participate in a joint venture for the
benefit of the activities of the Communications Authority of Thailand, as well as to
become a partner or shareholder of a partnership").
' See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 1 15.
224 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 145-48.
25 See Rondinelli, supra note 25, at 5; Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra
note 30, 15.
"2 See Thailand: Telecommunications in Thailand, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 18, 1995,
at 4 (explaining the BTO arrangement TelecomAsia has with the TOT where
TelecomAsia must transfer all of its assets to the TOT before the system starts
operating) [hereinafter Telecommunications in Thailand].
'z See Rondinelli, supra note 25, at 5.
22 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 145-48; Rondinelli, supra note 25,
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rangement, on the other hand, the private sector entity initially funds,
installs, and then operates the relevant network or service for a period of
years." 9 At the end of this concessionary period, the firm transfers
ownership of the particular assets to the government.'
The Thai government is comfortable with this type of relationship,
in part, because the TOT and CAT retain ownership of the assets once
the system is built' The private firm is simply a licensee and operates
the system for a fixed number of years.'32 In this way, Thailand's tele-
communications infrastructure benefits from a more rapid pace of devel-
opment than it did while being financed solely by the Thai govern-
ment.' In addition, the government retains ownership of the assets as
required by law, and avoids the cumbersome process of repealing or
amending the telecommunications acts.'34
An interesting feature of the BOT and BTO arrangements is that the
private sector entity is actually made up of a consortia of various domes-
tic Thai and international telecommunications fimns. 3 In many ways,
the domestic partner is simply a figurehead, while the more experienced
international partner is responsible for management of the construction
project." Thus, it appears as though the government has constructed a
loophole to open the door for the private sector to invest and participate
in the development of the country's telecommunications infrastructure."
Furthermore, it appears as though the government has found a way to en-
courage foreign investment without immediately having to repeal or
amend the TOT and CAT's charters. 38
The TOT awarded its first concession contract to Charoen Pokphand
(CP Group), now TelecomAsia, in September 1991.'"' The contract took
at 5; Telecommunications in Thailand, supra note 126.
12 See Thailand, supra note 117, at 37; AMBROSE ET AL., supra note 19, at 27.
' See Thailand, supra note 117, at 37.
,' Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 145-48.
13 See Thailand, supra note 117, at 37.
' See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, I 15.
' See id.
13 See AMBROSE ET AL., supra note 19, at 28. For example, in May 1990, a
consortia of five foreign telecommunications corporations submitted bids for the
manufacture of digital switching equipment. See id.
' See generally WELLENIuS & STERN, supra note 21, at 197.
'n See Thailand: Telecommunications Market Profile, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK
MARKET REP., Oct. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Mktrpt File.
' Telecommunications and Power, Part II, supra note 103, at 24.
, See id. TelecomAsia is a subsidiary of the CP Group, which holds 60% of
TelecomAsia. See TelecomAsia: Emerging Force in Asian Telecoms, INSTITUTIONAL
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the form of a BOT and called for TelecomAsia to fund and install two
million phone lines in the Bangkok metropolitan area between 1992 and
1996, and then operate them for twenty-five years." TelecomAsia iden-
tified New York-based NYNEX as its strategic partner,' and Siemens,
AT&T, and NEC as its suppliers. 2 Under the negotiated agreement,
TelecomAsia channels sixteen percent of its revenues to TOT. 3 As of
September 1992, TelecomAsia had begun the installation of lines in
Bangkok, and by May 1993 had delivered 106,000 lines to the TOT,
40,000 more than required under the concession."
In July 1992, TOT awarded its second twenty-five year concession
to Thai Telephone & Telecommunications Company (TT&T).'" The ar-
rangement called for TT&T to install one million phone lines in the rural
areas outside Bangkok. The Thai Telephone & Telecommunications
Company chose Nippon Telephone and Telegraph as its strategic part-
ner,'" and Ericsson and Alcatel as its suppliers. 7 Under the agree-
INVESTOR, Oct. 1994, at S26; TelecomAsia: A Major New Force in Telecommunications,
ASIAMoNEY, Mar. 1994, available in UMI Powerpages, Business Periodicals Database
[hereinafter A Major New Force].
"0o See How Thai Liberalization Plan Will Benefit TelecomAsia and TT&T, FIECH
TELECOM MARKETS, April 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File;
A Major New Force, supra note 139 (explaining that TelecomAsia will build, transfer,
and operate two million telephone lines, and will run the concession for 25 years).
"" See WELLENIUs & STERN, supra note 21, at 212. TelecomAsia initially identified
British Telecom as the foreign operator responsible for management of the construction
project. See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, J[ 29. However,
following the military coup in Spring 1991 and a long and contentious review process
which saw TelecomAsia relinquish its bid for an additional one million lines outside
of Bangkok, NYNEX replaced British Telecom as the outside contractor. See
WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 212. It is estimated that NYNEX will invest
close to $100 million for a 10% share of TelecomAsia. See Thailand: Telecommunica-
tions Market Profile, supra note 137, I 2. NYNEX serves as project manager and
holds a 15% equity share in TelecomAsia. See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile,
supra note 30, 29.
'42 See Thailand: Telecommunications Market Profile, supra note 137, 2. Siemens
is subcontracted to supply 1 million lines, while AT&T and NEC are subcontracted out
to supply 500,000 lines each. See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30,
16.
3 See A Major New Force, supra note 139.
See id. "By the end of 1993, [TelecomAsia] had installed a total of 301,500
lines." Id. Furthermore, it is estimated that this project will cost between three and four
billion dollars (U.S.). See WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 212.
', See WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 212.
' NTT is the strategic partner and project operator and holds a 20% share in
TT&T. See Thailand: Telecommunications Profile, supra note 30, 29.
" See Telecommunications: Millions of New Lines in Fresh Plan, E. ASIAN AFF.,
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ment, TI&T provides TOT with 43.1% of its revenues in return for the
ability to provide telecommunications services in rural areas expected to
involve a significant percentage of profitable long-distance and inter-
national calls."
With the emergence of private sector involvement in the telecommu-
nications sector, the Royal Thai government enacted the Act on Permit-
ting the Private Sector to Participate in or Operate State Business, B.E.
2535 (Joint Venture Act) in April 1992.2"9 The purpose of the Joint
Venture Act was twofold. First, the Act was meant to encourage the
private sector to invest more in its state-owned enterprises, effectively
enhancing the infrastructure of the telecommunication sector."' Second,
the Act also served to legitimize the concession contracts that the TOT
and CAT had entered into with TelecomAsia, as well as those it was
about to enter into with TT&T. It was the government's position that
these joint ventures would be monitored very closely by the Ministry of
Transport and Communications (MOTC) "to ensure 'transparency and
cleanliness.""' . Under the Act, investment in the telecommunications
sector by private consortia has increased considerably. From 1992 through
1995, the private sector invested $3.8 billion in Thailand's telecommu-
nications infrastructure.' In 1996, the private sector was expected to
invest another $1.1 billion, constituting seventy-five percent of the total
investment in the telecommunications infrastructure according to the
figures presented by the NESDB in its Seventh Five-Year Development
Master Plan.
Yet, despite these modest gains, the Joint Venture Act has its
limitations." First, the Joint Venture Act has failed to delineate clearly
the scope of each individual venture."5 While it maps out the procedur-
al guidelines for private sector participation,'56 the Joint Venture Act
Mar. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
1 See generally Thailand: Telecommunications Market Profile, supra note 137.
Act on Permitting the Private Sector to Participate in or Operate State Business,
B.E. 2535, (1992).
" Id. opening decree (stating that "it is expedient to have a law on permitting the
private sector to participate in or operate state business").
" Telecommunications in Thailand, supra note 126.
S See Thailand, supra note 117, at 38.
15 See id.
' See WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 213.
"s See generally Act on Permitting the Private Sector to Participate in or Operate
State Business, B.E. 2535, ch. 2, §§ 6-11, ch. 3, §§ 12-21 (explaining bureaucratic
problems of approving private sector participation in public projects).
" Id. § 6 (stating that "[a] government agency developing the project that wishes
to have the private sector participate in or operate any project, shall propose to the
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fails to address the substantive issues such as how to integrate the new
and established operators from an operational and technical standpoint.57
Instead, these decisions are made by an appointed committee on an ad
hoc basis, leaving room for considerable discrepancy from project to
project."' For example, the contractual terms for TelecomAsia's three-
million-line project in 1991 were drawn so loosely that they were useless
as guidelines for the future, including Tr&T's bid in 1992."9
Second, and more importantly, the Joint Venture Act has failed to
address the conflict of interest problems incurred by the Royal Thai
government as it begins the process of sectoral restructuring and the
eventual privatization of the TOT and the CAT."W Both the TOT and
the CAT still act as both a supervisor/regulator and service-
provider/operator.' There is considerable duplication of work by the
two state enterprises," and it is clear that "this confusion of roles will
ultimately make more difficult the task of third-party contractors like
TelecomAsia and TT&T more difficult."''  Moreover, the resultant
rivalry between the new service providers and existing government bodies
Ministry to which it is attached the detailed result[s] of [the] study and [the] analysis
on the project on subject matters as prescribed by [the] Office of the Board of Nation-
al Economic and Social Development"). The Joint Venture Act grants a select commit-
tee certain powers and duties "to consider [and] approve the draft announcement
inviting the private sector to participate in or operate, [the] terms of reference, and
[the] essential conditions which must be included in the joint participation or operation
[of the project]." Id. ch. 3, § 14(1). However, the Joint Venture Act fails to address
the guidelines where the committee is to select the participants and determine the
conditions for participation. Id. ch. 3, § 14(3).
'" See WELLEMNUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 213 ("Other difficult issues not ad-
dressed under the Joint Venture Act include the role of the private contractor in
providing operational capabilities, timing of transfer of new assets to existing entities,
and methods of financing").
158 See id.; Suphaphan Plengmaneephan & Amomrat Mahithiruk, Thailand: TT&T
Still Protected Under Silent Line Deal, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 22, 1995, at 19. For
example, in an attempt to eliminate the protection periods of the two largest telecom-
munications concession holders under the Joint Venture Act, both TI&T and
TelecomAsia were not to receive equal treatment. TT&T was permitted to retain its
period of protection from other private telecommunications companies through Septem-
ber 1996. See id. Meanwhile, TelecomAsia agreed to immediately end its protection
period for 1996. See Telecommunications in Thailand, supra note 126.
'5 See Telecommunications in Thailand, supra note 126.
'6 See WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 213.
161 See Thailand: Cabinet May Debate Roles of Private Telecom Firms, BANGKOK
POST, Mar. 28, 1995, at 21.
162 See id.
'" WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 213.
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has stifled growth as both groups attempt to work out potentially differing
approaches to their respective business objectives. 6"
Furthermore, this relationship under the Joint Venture Act does not
necessarily place TelecomAsia and TT&T in an enviable position."6 If
the TOT and the CAT retain their status as SOEs, they would continue
to have considerable leverage over TelecomAsia and TT&T, since they
would both retain responsibility for setting tariffs." However, the Royal
Thai government's privatization of the TOT and the CAT, without
amending or superseding the Joint Venture Act, would also work to
further complicate matters." Eventually, the privatization of these two
government entities "will inevitably ensure a more intensive review of the
long-term relationship of the TOT and the CAT as well as their respec-
tive relationships with TelecomAsia and TT&T."'' Without a complete
delineation of sector relationships and policies, which the Joint Venture
Act clearly does not provide, potential investors in the TOT, the CAT,
and private entities like TelecomAsia and TT&T will refuse to make sig-
nificant financial commitments to the Thai telecommunications sector."
Consequently, it is not too surprising that the Royal Thai government has
concluded that a new national telecommunications plan must be enacted
for effective liberalization of the telecommunications sector to take
place. 70
V. OTHER METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION: DIVESTMENT,
DEMONOPOLIZATION, AND THE THAI TELECOMMUNICATIONS MASTER
PLAN
Before ultimately examining the merits and flaws of the BOT and
BTO agreements, it is important to question why the Royal Thai gov-
ernment chose this particular form of privatization to jump start its
telecommunications sector instead of a number of other forms of privat-
ization. There are numerous forms of privatization, each with countless
'" See Mallet, supra note 83. Likewise, the World Bank recognizes this same
"conflict of interest" within the TOT itself. See Preaching Privatization to Thai
Telecoms, E. ASIAN AFF., Jan. 4, 1995, at 67, 67 (stating that "as an operator [the
TOT] must maximize revenue while as a regulator it may seek faster network expan-
sion") [hereinafter Preaching Privatization].
" See Sorry, Wrong Number: Thai Telecoms: Only for the Long-Term Punter,
AsiAwEEK, Feb. 23, 1996, at 63 [hereinafter Sorry, Wrong Number].
"' See WELLENIus & STERN, supra note 21, at 213.
,6 See Thailand: Telephone Company Privatizes, supra note 102.
368 WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 213.
169 See id.
" See generally Telecommunications and Power Part II, supra note 103.
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variations, which have also been considered as alternatives to the expan-
sion of government responsibility in the sector.' As has been stated,
"[a] broader concept of privatization encompasses a wide range of
policies to encourage private-sector participation in public service provi-
sion and that eliminate or modify the monopoly status of public
enterprise."'" Therefore, in answering this question, it is important to
first examine the characteristics of other forms of privatization, two of
which are the complete divestment of the SOE and the marketization
and elimination of the SOE's monopoly. 74
Unlike the "privatization partnership" taking place in Thailand, a
large number of governments have taken what some consider the "easy
route" and simply sold off their state-owned assets, 75 including their
telecommunications network and services. 76 Divestment of the state
enterprise has been accomplished in a number of ways, including a public
offering of shares; n a private sale of shares to domestic or foreign
investors; 78 and management or employee buy-outs.' Furthermore, in
the telecommunications sector, the government has the option of either
selling all or part of the SOE as a single entity, or dividing up the
network and privatizing various components." ° In each case, there is
likely to be a need for the SOE to restructure.''
,71 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 141-48.
172 Id. at 142.
"n For an overview of complete divestiture as a means of privatization, see generally
KIKERI ET AL., supra note 1.
" For an overview of "marketization" and "demonopolization" as a form of privat-
ization, see generally Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1; Bishop & Mody, supra note
17 (discussing the reasons for, and process of, demonopolization of a government-owned
telecommunications monopoly).
15 See Rondinelli, supra note 25, at 3.
176 See AMBROSE ET AL., supra note 19, at 12.
"n See generally Durchslag et al., supra note 68, at 3. The transfer of ownership via
public sale is most useful when the government is trying to develop the country's
capital markets or to use equity to gain support among the employees. See id.
"T See id. at 4. A private sale is advisable in sectors where operating experience
and technology is crucial, as in the telecommunications sector. See id.
"' See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 142. In the United Kingdom, em-
ployees who purchased British Telecom stock were considered the "main winners." See
generally Ingo Vogelsang, The United Kingdom, in Does Privatization Deliver? (Ahmed
Galal & Mary Sirley eds., 1994).
ISO See AMBROSE Er AL., supra note 19, at 13.
1 See id. at 39; Bishop & Mody, supra note 17 (discussing three steps necessary
in enterprise restructuring of a government-owned telecommunications monopoly).
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Likewise, the marketization and demonopolization of the SOE is
another popular form of privatization that has been chosen by a number
of countries." By restructuring their SOEs to make them more efficient
and effective, countries have made them compete with or operate like
private companies.' This method of privatization has been accom-
plished in several ways. First, several countries have tried to eliminate the
SOE's monopoly by eliminating subsidies, thereby forcing the SOE to
recover costs or to make a profit.' 4 A second means of privatizing in
this manner has been to create joint stock companies in which public and
private investors hold shares and give direction to the enterprise." A
third way has been to allow private firms to compete with SOEs in pro-
viding goods and services, which effectively eliminates the SOE's monop-
oly position." Finally, a few countries have chosen to break up their
SOEs into divisions, some of which are divested while others are retained
as public enterprises. 7
Although both are somewhat controversial,8 these two methods of
privatization have proven successful in bringing substantial gains to the
sector when they are implemented properly.8 9 For example, it is impera-
tive that divestment of the assets of the SOE be combined with an
appropriate regulatory environment." In addition, the barriers to entry
must be low enough to permit competition."' These gains can only be
" See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 143-44.
' See Casey & Wu, supra note 17, at 788-90 (discussing the restructuring of the
telecommunications sector in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Mexico, and Argen-
tina).
4 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 144.
i See Rondinelli, supra note 25, at 5-6.
' See generally Bishop & Mody, supra note 17; Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note
1, at 144.
"8 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 144.
' For an overview of how controversial complete divestiture can be, see generally
DOES PRIVATIZATION DELIVER?, supra note 179.
19 See Ahmed Galal & Mary Shirley, Overview to DoEs PRIVATIZATION DELIVER?,
supra note 179, at 3, 4.
' See Casey & Wu, supra note 17, at 786-88.
'91 See AMBROSE ET AL., supra note 19, at 12. For example, following the intro-
duction of the 1991 U.K. Government White Paper, the United Kingdom offered
complete freedom for any organization, local or foreign, to compete in long distance
and local services as well as the supply of voice, data, and value-added services. See
Colin Long, United Kingdom, INT'L FiN. L. REV., Supp. Mar. 1992, at 73, 73.
Consumers benefitted substantially from this type of divestiture. See KixM ET AL,
supra note 1, at 28.
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attained if privatization is accomplished with the introduction of competi-
tion wherever possible and without special concessions or privileges."
Nevertheless, even when the privatization plan is properly implement-
ed, many developing countries still find it difficult to attain the gains that
one would expect."9 In a number of countries, the slow pace of the pri-
vatization may simply be the result of a government which has not been
genuinely committed to capitalist policies in the past, and therefore lacks
credibility with buyers and investors. 9 ' A related issue in these coun-
tries is that there is no competitive private sector into which these
enterprises can be privatized."gs Furthermore, establishing a competitive
private sector takes a wealth of time and institutional development in the
form of a legal framework, contractual enforcement, and a reasonable
capital market.'
In Thailand, both complete divestiture and demonopolization of the
TOT and the CAT have been considered by the Royal Thai govern-
ment."9 In fact, the proposed national telecommunications master plan
which was forwarded recently to the Cabinet considers these same means
of privatization.'98 The Royal Thai government began soliciting privat-
ization consulting services for the TOT as early as October 1992."9 The
government has been advised that the TOT should consider selling a
,92 See Galal & Shirley, supra note 189, at 4.
"9 See Lawrence H. Summers, A Changing Course Toward Privatization, in DOES
PRIVATIZATION DELIVER?, supra note 179, at 11, 12-16.
'"' See id. at 15-16. This has been referred to by some as the "privatization trap."
Id. at 15. For a government which is caught in the privatization trap, it is difficult for
it to receive a fair price for the sale of the SOE and behave properly too. See id. at
16. Because of the government's poor record in terms of capitalist policies, buyers will
be wary and the SOE will not fetch a high price. If the government behaves properly
and keeps interference at a minimum, the buyer will ultimately get a windfall; and if
it does not behave properly, then the government will get more out of the deal, at
least in the short-run, but the price will ultimately fall over time since the
government's credibility will suffer. See id. This appears to have been the problem in
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan where weak stock markets and low demand for shares
slowed the process of selling SOEs in the early 1990s. See Rondinelli & Kasarda,
supra note 1, at 151.
" See Nancy Birdsall, The Jigsaw Puzzle, in DoEs PRIVATIZATION DELIVER?, supra
note 179, at 107, 109.
'9 See id.
'97 See Thailand Industry: Master Plan for Telecoms, GLOBAL FIN. MARKETS, May
1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
'98 See Thailand: Telecom Master Plan Forwarded to Cabinet, BANGKOK POST, Feb.
16, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Bngpst File.
'9' See TOT to be Restructured, supra note 108.
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significant percentage of its equity to a potential strategic partner as the
first step towards achieving privatization.2 The TOT-Restructuring and
Privatization Study recommends that the TOT make an initial public of-
fering of twenty-one percent of its equity and allocate five percent of this
equity to its employees at less than IPO price, on top of a sale of twenty
percent to a strategic partner.2a 1 The SOE would automatically become
a private organization following the reduction of its stake to forty-nine
percent.'
The Royal Thai government has been guided by the recommendation
of institutions such as the World Bank in developing its National Tele-
communications Master Plan. First, the government wants to separate
the role of the operator from that of the regulatory watchdog body. In
their place, the drafters of the master plan propose setting up the National
Communications Board (NCB) to act as a politically neutral regulator of
the sector. Ultimately, it is conceivable that the NCB could become
responsible for frequency utilization and allocation.m 6
Second, the Master Plan will ultimately permit the TOT and the
CAT to openly compete with private companies. Drafts of the Master
See id.
" See id. The study was prepared by Coopers & Lybrand with assistance from
consultants Thai Investment and Securities, Merrill Lynch, and Chula Unisearch as well
as the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP. See id.
See id.; Lob Hui Yin, Thailand to Allow Competition in Growing Telecom
Industry, Bus. Tm, Mar. 30, 1995, at 3 (stating that "up to 49 percent of the two
state enterprises would be sold to the private sector. Of the 49 percent, foreign
investors could buy a maximum of 20 percent and the Crown Property Bureau, which
manages the royal family's assets, 2 percent").
2 See Preaching Privatization, supra note 164.
See Plan Alternative, supra note 78, at 24.
See Sinfah Tunsarawuth, Thailand Completes Drafts for Telecoms Privatization,
STRArrs TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1995, § 4, at 35. For the NCB to maintain its neutrality, the
secretary-general of the Telecommunication Association of Thailand has suggested that
the organization should have its own operating budget independent of the government.
See Suphaphan Plengmaneephan & Nondhanada Intarakomalyasut, Thailand: Kosol
Doub#ful NCB Can Stay Out of Politics, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 3, 1995, at 17. It is be-
lieved that the NCB should be able to generate enough income from licenses to private
telecommunications operators. See id.
' See Loh, supra note 202; Plengmaneepun & Intarakomalyasut, supra note 205,
at 17; Preaching Privatization, supra note 164 (explaining that "[o]ne of the main jobs
of the body would be to set tariffs in keeping with the rules of open competition" [and
to] "guarantee the rule of nondiscrimination for users and ensure transparency with
regard [to] costs").
20 See Plan Alternative, supra note 78, at 24.
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Plan propose that the TOT and the CAT be combined and then split into
two separate entities.' One entity would be maintained as an SOE and
would oversee the installation of the main networks and provide guide-
lines for future development.' The remaining entity would become a
public company to be listed on the stock market and provide actual
telecommunications services.210
Finally, to allow for as much competition as possible, the master
plan also calls for the creation of a zoning system to completely liberalize
the telecommunications sector.21" ' The country would be divided into five
zones, and bids would be open in each zone to enable at least one private
operator to compete with the government in providing the telecommunica-
tions network and services. 2 The zoning system would encourage all
private companies to compete on a level playing field because the net-
works would belong to the government under the SOE-portion of the
TOT and the CAT. Also, each private operator whether new or old would
have to pay the government to use the network. 3 Furthermore, each
zone would have to participate in revenue sharing to counter any advan-
tage that one zone may have over another.1 '
Yet, despite these overtures toward a more complete form of privat-
ization, the process has moved slowly.215 As recently as March 1995,
approval of the Master Plan appeared certain following the Cabinet's
endorsement of the Transport and Communication minister's proposal.
216
However, as is frequently the case in Thailand, political upheaval placed
the reform measure on hold.17 Consequently, even though the Demo-
See Tunsarawuth, supra note 205.
See id.
210 See id.
211 See generally Amomrat Mahitthirook & Chatrudee Theparat, Thailand: Telecom
Master Plan Endorsed, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 23, 1995, at 19 (discussing the liberaliza-
tion of the telecommunications sector).
212 Suphaphan Plengmaneephan, Thailand: Telecom Master Plan to be Revised,
BANGKOK POST, Aug. 29, 1995, at 17. The five zones would be Bangkok, the North,
the South, the Northeast, and the Central Plains. See id.
213 See id.
224 See id.
25 See Thailand: Explanation on Telecom Delay, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 22, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
226 See Mahitthirook & Theparat, supra note 211, at 19 (discussing endorsement of
the Master Plan by the Prime Minster); Loh, supra note 202 (discussing endorsement
of the Master Plan by the Cabinet).
27 See Fumio Okamoto, Thai Project Winners Hold the Line, NIKKEI WKLY., June
26, 1995, at 26. Then Prime Minister Chuan Leekphai dissolved the lower house in
May 1995 amid allegations of corruption against his Democrat Party administration. See
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cratic Party cabinet was able to rush through its approval of the tele-
communications plan,"' the new Chart Thai administration scrapped the
proposal in favor of a revised plan, which just recently has been forward-
ed to the Cabinet for approval.2 9 The revised plan is similar to the ear-
lier model, but the pace of change is accelerated dramatically to allow
new entrants to come into the fixed line sector and bid for contracts to
install approximately six million new lines. Nevertheless, due to the
slow processing of the plan, it is doubtful that the initial January 1, 1997
deadline for privatization will be met."' Thus, until the master plan is
enacted, the Royal Thai government will be forced to continue to rely on
BTO and BOT agreements to develop the infrastructure which the country
needs.m
VI. CONCLUSION: BOT AND BTO AGREEMENTS: FRIEND OR FOE?
Now, nearly six years after the government-controlled telecommuni-
cations sector entered into its first concessionary contract with
TelecomAsia, the question remains whether the BTO and BOT agree-
ments have been beneficial for the sector, or whether they will ultimately
be more of a burden to the sector and the economy. In some ways this
question is not fair since the Royal Thai government was left with very
few options. Because of the enormous demand for telecommunications
services and antiquated telecommunications laws which prohibited any
form of privatization, the government had no choice but to enter into
partnerships with TelecomAsia and TT&T.' However, the government
is not without blame. Instability, corruption, and indecisiveness have been
Political Outlook, Econ. Intelligence Unit Country Forecasts, Aug. 28, 1995, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Alleiu File.
1, See Okamoto, supra note 217.
219 See Thailand: Telecom Master Plan Forwarded to Cabinet, supra note 198. In
addition, the Thai Rating and Information Service has only recently started to evaluate
the performance of the TOT so that it can provide the government with a report to
help in privatization decisions. See Thailand Briefs: The Thai Rating and Information
Service Has Begun Evaluating Performance, TELENEwS ASIA, Jan. 12, 1996, available
in LEXIS, World Library, A~lnws File.
' See Thailand: Revised Telecom Plan to Allow New Operators, TSLENEws ASIA,
Oct. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
" See Thailand: Explanation on Telecom Delay, supra note 215. The Ministry of
Transport and Communications had submitted the master plan as of February 16, 1996.
Thailand: Telecom Master Plan Forwarded to Cabinet, supra note 198. However, it
was reported that the Cabinet "may not deal with the master plan right away:' Id.
' See Thailand: Review Phone Line Expansion Project, Cabinet Urges, BANGKOK
POST, Aug. 23, 1995, at 1.
22 See WELLENIUS & STERN, supra note 21, at 212.
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present in each administration during the 1990s." In fact, over the past
six years Thailand has seen three prime ministers, one interim prime min-
ister, and one military junta.' Certainly, this is not an environment
conducive to reform, liberalization, and investment.
Nevertheless, while hindsight is always twenty-twenty, it is still
important to examine the results of the past to better predict the future,
for both Thailand and other countries contemplating a BTO or BOT ar-
rangement. Unfortunately, at least in the case of Thailand, it is clear that
while these private-public partnerships are successful in the short-run,
their benefits begin to diminish in the long-term. In fact, it may be
argued that BTO and BOT agreements have actually discouraged or at
least delayed privatization in Thailand. Furthermore, in light of the
shortcomings reviewed below, the BTO and BOT agreements may also
prove to be a hindrance once a more full and complete form of privat-
ization is introduced to the telecommunications sector.'
First, while the BTO and BOT agreements have helped enhance the
telecommunications infrastructure and have improved telephone penetration
in Thailand, control remains in the hands of the Royal Thai govern-
ment.' The TOT and the CAT still serve as both operators and regula-
tors and the government retains responsibility for supervision and control
of the network and fixing standards and service fees." This conflict of
interest has most recently surfaced again as the TOT raised monthly tele-
phone line rental charges by twenty percent. 9 The increase, which is
estimated to earn up to $768 million in revenue for the TOT,' as well
as connection problems have made it even more difficult for many people
to afford maintaining a telephone in their home, resulting in lost custom-
ers and lost revenues for TelecomAsia and TT&T.' In addition, restric-
tions on the type and amount of equipment which can be procured add
further cost for private companies.2 Thus, with their earning capacity
" See The Business Environment: Infrastructure, ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT
COUNTRY FORECAST, Sept. 3, 1993, available in, LEXIS, World Library, Alleiu File.
' See Thailand, Walden Reports, supra note 50.
226 See generally AMBROSE E' AL., supra note 19, at 27-28.
See Technology Brief. TelecomAsia Corp., THE AsIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
1995, at 12 (discussing how the Thai Cabinet simply rescinded the five-year "protection
period" it had granted TelecomAsia in return for TelecomAsia installing two million
phone lines in Bangkok).
' Thailand: Telecommunications in Thailand, supra note 126.
See Thailand Briefs, TELENEws AsIA, Mar. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File.
See id.
231 See Sorry, Wrong Number, supra note 165.
232 See AMBROSE ET AL., supra note 19, at 28. For example, procurement of a
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adversely affected by these government policies, the BTO and BOT
systems have actually served to discourage some in the private sector
from playing a greater role in the provision of telecommunications servic-
Moreover, full privatization of the telecommunications sector in
Thailand has also been hindered by the "exclusivity" clauses in the BTO
and BOT agreements. Only two private companies, TelecomAsia and
TT&T, have been permitted entry into the fixed-line telecommunications
sector, and each was initially granted an exclusive right in a particular
region for a fixed number of years. 5 Although these exclusivity clauses
with TelecomAsia and Tr7&T have since been amended, they were
very costly to the government in terms of time, revenue, and power. The
agreements with TelecomAsia and T&T have actually served to delay
expansion of the infrastructure in Bangkok and other regions since the
government was unable to enter into a BTO or BOT agreement with any
other private company 7 In addition, renegotiation with both companies
forced the government to expand the number of lines each could con-
struct. 8 Finally, because of the government's weak position, it has
negotiated to increase the royalties of both TelecomAsia and Tr&T."9
It has also granted a tax rebate on the value-added tax collected on
TelecomAsia's and TT&T's service fees.' This could amount to a loss
of 200 million baht for the Royal Thai government."4
Finally, these exclusivity clauses have also prevented the sector from
opening up to competition, and have merely transferred monopolistic
switching system in volumes greater than 200,000 lines may cost $150-per line, while
smaller quantities may cost as much $1000 per line. See id.
' See Thailand: Telecoms Regulatory Body Needed, Says TCT, BANGKOK PosT,
Mar. 30, 1995, at 20.
3 See Mallet, supra note 83.
See Thailand: Competitors Vie for Access, TELENEWS AsiA, Mar. 7, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
2 See Thailand: TT&T Still Protected Under Silent Line Deal, supra note 158.
See id.
s See id. For example, the TOT has awarded TT&T an additional 500,000-line pro-
ject in its provinces for Tr&T's agreeing to limit its protection period from 1998 to
September 1991. See id.
239 See Thailand: Phone Line Royalties Set to Go Before Cabinet, BANGKOK POST,
Aug. 17, 1995, at 19 (stating that the government negotiated to increase TelecomAsia's
royalty from 16% to 21% and TT&T's royalty from 43.1% to 44.5%).
210 See Thailand: TT&T Lines Up Behind TA to Demand Tax Rebate, BANGKOK
POST, Mar. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
241 See id. Twenty-five baht approximately equal one dollar. See Thailand, Walden
Reports, supra note 50.
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practices from the public to the private sector.242 This transfer has per-
mitted big business to obtain greater economic and political influence
which is difficult for public officials to control.243 Furthermore, these
private monopolies also have very little incentive to operate efficient-
ly.' For example, in spite of an overall shortage of telephone lines in
Thailand, TelecomAsia and TL'&T have saturated traditional markets of
high usage with new lines, creating a surplus that is going unused and
therefore not generating revenue.' Thus, the BTO and BOT agreements
may actually delay a more complete form of privatization.
However, one last question remains as to the ultimate success of the
new telecommunications Master Plan. Although any further form of
liberalization and privatization in the telecommunications sector is wel-
come, the Master Plan will most likely enjoy only modest success for
several reasons. First, the Master Plan is likely to see entrenched opposi-
tion from political leaders,24 the military, 7 and the labor unions con-
tinue beyond the next Five-Year Plan.24 Historically, these groups have
represented the status quo, and without any form of consensus amongst
242 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 154.
243 See id.
244 See Ted Bardacke, Thai Telecoms Soar Despite Operating Weakness, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 6, 1996, at 26 (stating that such monopolies reported net profits in
1995 despite an overall shortage of lines in the country).
24 See id.; Asia Embraces, Rejects Deregulation by Market, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan.
15, 1996, at 120.
246 See Suphaphan Plengmaneepun, Thailand: Rejected Venture 'Would Have Greatly
Benefitted CAT,' BANGKOK POST, Oct. 13, 1995, at 28. For example, an opportunity by
the CAT to invest 25 million baht in a recent joint venture project was opposed by
Deputy Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and rejected by the Cabinet. See id. The
joint venture would have enhanced satellite uplink-downlink telecommunications services
among television and foreign news agencies, rivaling Singapore as the region's
telecommunications center. Id.; see also Suphaphan Plengmaneepun, Thailand: MOTC
May Weaken to Set Up Uplink-Downlink Firm With CAT, Others, BANGKOK POST, Jan.
10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. Thaksin Shinawatra is
founder of what is considered the most successful Thai telecommunications company
and his assets are valued at nearly $3.3 billion. See Sinfah Tunsarawuth, One of the
World's Richest Ministers, STRArrS TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1994, at 3; Suphaphan
Plengmaneepun, Thailand: Thai Politics 'A Mess,' Says Telecom Company Executive,
BANGKOK POST, Jan. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bngpst File (discuss-
ing that the CEO of telecom conglomerate United Communication Industry has declared
that he is "turning his back on politics because it is 'a mess').
247 See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 152.
248 See id. (stating that members of civil labor unions have been outspoken in their
opposition to privatization, "fearing that transfer of services to the private sector will
not only result in job losses but will also reduce their power in the service industry").
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them, it is likely that the telecommunications sector will remain in
havoc.249 It is extremely important then for the coalition leaders of the
present administration to place their political differences aside and work
to pass an effective Telecommunications Master Plan or Thailand may
once again see a rise in public discontent."
Second, the government has frequently had difficulty trying to
implement any reform proposal. Yet, it is imperative that the government
implement the proper legal and regulatory framework to separate poten-
tially competitive activities, clarify service goals, develop cost-
minimization targets, and create an agency to supervise the process."1
Presently, a regulatory framework does not exist in Thailand that is free
from any conflict of interest"z2 Nor does the current legislation offer
any assistance.
Whether the new Telecommunications Master Plan can resolve these
problems is just a matter of time and political will. History has shown
that it will be an uphill battle no matter which government administration
is leading the fight. Yet, if Thailand is to compete with other countries
in the region and remain in contention as one of Southeast Asia's
business centers, 4 and it is clear that the Royal Thai government needs
to separate the telecommunications industry from government bu-
reaucracy. 5
249 See id. at 158
" See Teena Gill, Thailand Politics: Stormy Times Ahead for Coalition Government,
Inter Press Service, Jan. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File;
Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 151 (stating that "opposition remains strong
... impeding the implementation of privatization policies").
"' See Rondinelli & Kasarda, supra note 1, at 157-60; see generally KDOR Er AL.,
supra note 1 (discussing divestment as a means of privatization and the government
role in the process).
S See Preaching Privatization, supra note 164 (stating that the World Bank sees a
necessity in establishing an independent regulatory entity for the telecommunications
sector).
' See Sherer, supra note 113.
2 See Richard Ehrlich, Thailand-Asia: Bangkok Fast Becoming Region's Business
Hub, Inter Press Service, Feb. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File;
Thailand to Become Telecom Skills Development Center, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Jan.
3, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
, See Tunsarawuth, supra note 205 (quoting Mr. Sansem Wongchaum, deputy
secretary-general of the National Economic and Social Development Board, the Royal
Thai government's top planning agency as saying that the government "need[s] to pull
the telecommunications industry out of [the] bureaucratic system").
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